Trading Population for Productivity: Theory and Evidence by Oded Galor & Andrew Mountford
Trading Population for Productivity: Theory and Evidence
Oded Galor and Andrew Mountford￿
February 1, 2008
Abstract
This research argues that the di⁄erential e⁄ect of international trade on the demand for human capital
across countries has been a major determinant of the distribution of income and population across the
globe. In developed countries the gains from trade have been directed towards investment in education
and growth in income per capita, whereas a signi￿cant portion of these gains in less developed economies
have been channeled towards population growth. Cross-country regressions establish that indeed trade
has positive e⁄ects on fertility and negative e⁄ects on education in non-OECD economies, while inducing
fertility decline and human capital formation in OECD economies.
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01 Introduction
The dramatic transformation in the distribution of income and population across the globe in the past two
centuries is one of the most signi￿cant mysteries in the growth process. Some regions have excelled in the
growth of income per capita while other regions have been dominant in population growth.1 This striking
contrast between the development paths of large subsets of the world economy gives rise to fundamental
questions about the growth process and its implications for current and historical development patterns.
Notably, how does one account for the sudden take-o⁄ from stagnation to growth in some countries in the
world and the persistent stagnation in others? Why have the di⁄erences in per capita incomes across countries
increased so markedly in the last two centuries? Has the pace of transition to sustained economic growth
in advanced economies adversely a⁄ected the process of development in less-developed economies? Have the
forces of international trade contributed to the divergence in the timing of the demographic transition and
the emergence of sustained economic growth across countries?
The origin of this ￿ Great Divergence￿in income per capita has been a source of controversy. The rela-
tive roles of geographical and institutional factors, human capital formation, ethnic, linguistic and religious
fractionalization, colonialism and globalization have been at the center of a debate about this remarkable
change in the world income distribution in the past two centuries.2
This research suggests that international trade has played a signi￿cant role in the di⁄erential timing
of demographic transitions across countries and has been a major determinant of the distribution of world
population and the ￿ Great Divergence￿in income per capita across countries in the last two centuries. The
analysis suggests that international trade has an asymmetrical e⁄ect on the evolution of industrial and non-
industrial economies. While in the industrial nations the gains from trade have been directed primarily
towards investment in education and growth in output per capita, a greater portion of the gains from trade
in non-industrial nations has been channeled towards population growth.
The expansion of international trade enhanced the specialization of industrial economies in the pro-
duction of industrial, skilled intensive, goods. The associated rise in the demand for skilled labor has
induced a gradual investment in the quality of the population, expediting a demographic transition, stimu-
lating technological progress and further enhancing the comparative advantage of these industrial economies
in the production of skilled intensive goods. In non-industrial economies, in contrast, international trade
has generated an incentive to specialize in the production of unskilled intensive, non-industrial, goods. The
absence of signi￿cant demand for human capital has provided limited incentives to invest in the quality of
1In the time period 1820-1998, the ratio between income per capita in the richest region of the world and the poorest region
of the world has increased from about 3 to 19. In particular, the ratio between income per capita in Western Europe and Asia
grew nearly three-fold, whereas the ratio between the Asian population and the Western European population grew nearly
two-fold (Maddison, 2001).
2North (1981), Landes (1998), Mokyr (2002), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, et al. (2005), Easterly and Levine (2003),
Rodrik, et al. (2004) and Ashraf and Galor (2007) have argued that institutions that facilitated the protection of property rights
and enhanced technological research, the di⁄usion of knowledge, and the transmission of society speci￿c human capital, have
been the prime factors that enabled the earlier European take-o⁄ and the great technological divergence across the globe. The
e⁄ect of geographical factors on economic growth and the great divergence have been emphasized by Jones (1981), Diamond
(1997), Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1998) and Pomeranz (2000). Finally, the role of human capital in the great divergence
is underlined in uni￿ed growth theory (Galor, 2005; Galor and Weil 2000; Galor and Moav, 2002; McDermott, 2002; Doepke,
2004; Lagerlof, 2006; Galor et al., 2006) and is documented empirically by Glaeser et al. (2004).
1the population and the gains from trade have been utilized primarily for a further increase in the size of the
population, rather than the income of the existing population.3 The demographic transition in these non-
industrial economies has been signi￿cantly delayed, increasing further their relative abundance of unskilled
labor, enhancing their comparative disadvantage in the production of skilled intensive goods and delaying
their process of development. The research suggests, therefore, that international trade has persistently af-
fected the distribution of population, skills, and technologies in the world economy, and has been a signi￿cant
force behind the ￿ Great Divergence￿in income per capita across countries.
This paper develops a uni￿ed growth theory that captures the asymmetric role that international trade
may have played in expediting the transition to sustained economic growth in technologically advanced
economies and in delaying the transition in technologically inferior economies. The proposed theory is
innovative in two dimensions. First, unlike the recent literature on the transition of economies from an
epoch of Malthusian stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth that abstracted from the Great
Divergence and focused on the evolution of the world economy from stagnation to growth,4 the proposed
theory examines the di⁄erential patterns of takeo⁄s across regions in the world and the emergence of the
Great Divergence. Second, in contrast to the existing literature on the dynamics of comparative advantage,5
the focus on the interaction between population growth and comparative advantage and the persistent e⁄ect
that this interaction may have on the distribution of population and income in the world economy generates
an important new insight regarding the distribution of the gains from trade. The theory suggests that even
if trade equalizes output growth in the trading countries, (due to the terms of trade e⁄ect), income per capita
of developed and less developed economies will diverge, since in developed economies the growth of total
output will be generated primarily by an increase in output per capita, whereas in less developed economies
the contribution of population growth to the growth of total output will be more signi￿cant.6
The theory is based on several fundamental elements. The interaction between these elements gener-
ates a dynamic pattern that is consistent with the observed asymmetrical evolution of the world economy
from the epoch of Malthusian stagnation to the current era of sustained growth, characterized by widened
di⁄erences in income per capita and population growth rates, as well as by persistent patterns of compar-
ative advantage. Economies are initially in a Malthusian epoch in which the growth rate of output per
capita is rather small and population growth is positively related to the level of income per capita. Techno-
logical progress leads ultimately to the adoption of more advanced agricultural and industrial technologies
3Evidence suggests that the returns to human capital may have been higher in LDCs. One can therefore mistakenly
suppose that incentive to invest in child quality is higher in LDCs. However, these higher rates of return are not applicable
to most individuals. They re￿ect a suboptimal investment in human capital in an environment characterized by credit market
imperfections and limited access to schooling. International trade, therefore reduces further the modest demand for human
capital and reduces further the incentive to substitute child quality for quantity.
4In particular, Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) argue that the inherent positive interaction between population and technology
during the Malthusian regime increased the rate of technological progress su¢ ciently so as to induce investment in human
capital which led to further technological progress, a demographic transition, and sustained economic growth.
5See Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Stokey (1991), Young (1991), Matsuyama (1992), and
Atkeson and Kehoe (2000), among others.
6See, for example, Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) for the terms of trade e⁄ect. Deardor⁄ (1994) suggests that diverging
(exogenous) population growth rates can lead to widening international inequality. Similarly, Krugman and Venables (1995)
and Baldwin et al. (2001) argue that the reduction in transportation costs and the associated expansion in trade, generated
geographically based industrialization and divergence.
2which paves the way for the take-o⁄ from the Malthusian epoch. International trade induces technologi-
cally advanced economies to specialize in the production of skilled intensive manufactured goods whereas
technologically inferior economies specialize in the production of unskilled intensive agricultural goods. The
increase in the demand for human capital in the technologically advanced economies that is brought about
by international trade induces investment in human capital7 and expedites the demographic transition,8
whereas the reduction in the demand for human capital in less advanced economies delays the demographic
transition and investment in human capital.9
The analysis demonstrates that the acceleration of the demographic transition in the technologically
advanced economies increases their formation of human capital and brings about sustained technological
progress that enhances their comparative advantage in the production of skilled intensive industrial goods.10
In contrast, the delay in the demographic transition in the less advanced economies increases the supply of
unskilled workers and enhances the comparative advantage of these economies in the production of unskilled
intensive goods. Thus, consistent with the evidence provided in sections 5 and 6, the pattern of international
trade has reinforced the initial patterns of comparative advantage and has generated a persistent e⁄ect on
the distribution of population in the world economy and a great divergence in income per capita across
countries and regions.
The fundamental hypothesis is tested empirically using contemporary cross country data. In accor-
dance with the theory, cross country regressions support the hypothesis that international trade generates
opposing e⁄ects on fertility rates and education in developed and less developed economies. The analysis
establishes that a larger share of trade in GDP per capita has a positive e⁄ect on fertility and a negative
e⁄ect on human capital formation in non-OECD economies, whereas in OECD economies, trade triggers a
decline in fertility and an increase in human capital accumulation.
2 An Autarkic Economy
This section analyzes the path of a closed economy from its Malthusian pre-industrial state through a
transitional state of increased fertility, investment in human capital and economic growth to a modern state
with high investment in human capital, low population growth, and sustained economic growth.11
7Consistent with empirical evidence, the increased demand for human capital has not resulted necessarily in an increase in
the equilibrium rate of return to human capital due to a massive supply response generated by (a) the increase in the incentive
for investment in education (for a given cost), and (b) institutional changes (e.g., the provision of public education) that lowered
the cost of investment in human capital.
8Unlike Becker (1981)￿ s hypothesis where a high level of income induces parents to switch to having fewer, higher quality
children, the substitution of quality for quantity is in response to technological progress. The fact that demographic transitions
occurred around the same period in Western European countries that di⁄ered in their income per capita, but shared a similar
pattern of future technological progress, supports our technological approach.
9Moreover, the increased specialization of production within an economy would result, ceteris paribus, in increased income
and fertility inequality within the economy, in line with the ￿nding of Haines (2000) that fertility rate in rural areas remained
higher than for urban areas for signi￿cant periods in the nineteenth century in both the US and UK, as well as with the ￿ndings
of de la Croix and Doepke (2003) that income inequality causes di⁄erential fertility patterns within and across economies.
10Similarly to this element in the theory, Grossman and Helpman (1991) demonstrates that a country that begins with a
head start in the accumulation of knowledge often leads in productivity over time.
11Galor and Mountford (2006) abstracts from these stages of development and demonstrates in a simpler Ricardian model
that although international trade may equalize the growth rates of the value of total output in the two trading economies, since
the rate of population growth in the technologically regressed economy is higher than that in the advanced economy, the rate of
growth of output per capita in the technologically advanced economy will be higher than that in the technologically regressed
3Consider an overlapping-generations economy in which economic activity extends over in￿nite discrete
time. In every period t; two goods, a manufactured good, Y m
t ; and an agricultural good Y a
t , may be produced
using up to three factors of production, skilled labor, Ht, unskilled labor, Lt; and land, X. The supply of
skilled and unskilled labor is endogenously determined and evolves over time, whereas the quantity of land
is exogenously determined and remains constant over time.12
2.1 Production
In each of the sectors of the economy production may take place with either an old technology or a new one.
In early stages of development the new production technologies are latent and production is conducted using
the old technologies. However, in the process of development the productivity of the new technologies grows
faster than those of the old technologies and ultimately the new technologies become economically viable.
In the agricultural sector, the introduction of the new technology represents the escape from the Malthusian
trap, where wages do not fall despite an increase in population. In the industrial sector, the introduction of
the new technology re￿ ects an increase in the skill-intensity of the production process in the second phase
of the industrial revolution and the associated increase in the demand for human capital.
2.1.1 Production of the Agricultural Good
The agricultural good can be produced by either an old technology or a new one. The output of the








t )￿X1￿￿; 0 < ￿ < 1; (1)
where L
a;0
t is the amount of unskilled labor and X is the amount of land, employed in period t in the
production of the agricultural good using the old technology, and aa
t is the level of productivity of the old
technology in period t. For simplicity the amount of land is normalized such that X = 1.
The output of the agricultural good produced with the new technology in period t, Y
a;N
t ; is governed









t is the amount of unskilled labor employed in the production of the agricultural good in period t
using the new technology, and Aa
t is the level of productivity of the new agricultural technology in period t.
As will become apparent, in the early stages of development when the productivity of the new agri-
cultural technology, Aa
t; is low relative to the productivity of the old technology, aa
t; only the old technology
will be employed. However in later stages of development, when Aa
t rises su¢ ciently relative to aa
t; the new
agricultural technology becomes economically viable.
2.1.2 Production of the Manufactured Good
The manufactured good can be produced by either an old technology or a new one. The output of the










12Since the fundamental mechanism explored in this paper focuses on the role of human capital accumulation and the
demographic transition in the process of development, the abstraction from the role of physical capital is a natural simplifying
assumption.
13This production function is designed to capture the decline in the importance of land in mature state of development.




t is the amount of unskilled labor employed in period t in the production of the manufactured
good using the old technology, and am
t is the level of productivity of the old industrial technology in period
t.
The output of the manufactured good produced with the modern technology in period t, Y
m;N
t ; is





















t are the amounts of unskilled labor and skilled labor employed in the production of the industrial
good in period t using the new technology.
As established below, in the early stages of development when the technological level Am
t is low relative
to am
t only the old industrial technology is economically viable. However in the process of development as Am
t
rises su¢ ciently relative to am
t ; it becomes pro￿table for producers to employ the new industrial technology.
2.1.3 Factor Prices and Goods￿Prices
Producers operate in perfectly competitive markets for ￿nal goods and for labor. In the absence of property
rights to land, the return to land is zero and workers in the agricultural sector who use the old technology
receive their average products.14


















t is the wage of an unskilled labor in terms of the manufactured good, and pt as the relative price
of the agricultural good in terms of the manufactured good in period t.
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where as follows from the neoclassical properties of f(hm
t ); !0(hm
t ) < 0; limh!0 !(hm
t ) ! 1; and limh!1 !(hm
t ) =
0:
Since unskilled workers are mobile between the agricultural and the industrial sectors, the wages of
unskilled labor in both sectors are equal if both goods are produced. As follows from (5) and (6), pt; the
14See Galor and Weil (2000) for a discussion of alternative formulations in which property rights for land are present.
5relative price of the agricultural good in terms of the manufactured good in period t, is therefore
pt =
8
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2.2 Individuals: Fertility, Human Capital and Consumption
Individuals live for two periods. In their ￿rst period of life they consume a fraction of their parental unit
time endowment; educated o⁄spring require a larger fraction of parental time. In their second period of
life they are endowed with one unit of time of either skilled, s; or unskilled labor, u; which they optimally
allocate between child rearing and labor force participation.
2.2.1 Preferences and Budget Constraints
Individual￿ s preferences are de￿ned over consumption and the potential aggregate income of their children.15
The preferences of a member i; i = s;u; of generation t (i.e. an individual who is born in period t ￿ 1) are
















t are individual i￿ s consumption of the agricultural good and the consumption of the
manufactured good, respectively. ￿fi=s;ugwi
t+1ni is the total potential income of individual i￿ s o⁄spring,
where n
i;s
t is the number of o⁄spring trained to be skilled workers, n
i;u
t is the number of o⁄spring trained
to be unskilled workers, and ws
t+1 and wu
t+1 are the wages paid to skilled and unskilled o⁄spring in period
t + 1:16 Individuals face subsistence consumption constraint and they must consume a subsistence level of
the agricultural good, e c:
Individuals allocate their time between labor force participation and child rearing. They further
choose both the number and quality of children and the amount of each good to consume. Denoting the
time required to bring up a skilled o⁄spring as, ￿s, and the time required to bring up an unskilled o⁄spring
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i;u
t ￿u) ￿ wi
t:
15The number of children could be interpreted as the expected number of surviving children in a environment where due to
infant mortality rate only a fraction of the children born will survive. As long as the cost of raising non-surviving children is
insigni￿cant the results will not be a⁄ected qualitatively. The results are identical if the cost of raising non-surviving children is
zero and there is no uncertainty about the fraction of surviving children. Hence in an environment with higher infant mortality
fertility rate will be mechanically higher.
16The subsistence consumption constraint generates the Malthusian positive income elasticity of population growth at low
income levels. A Stone-Geary utility function of the form: ut = (c
i;a








t ]1￿￿￿￿ would generate
identical qualitative results. The second component of the utility function may represent either intergenerational altruism, or
implicit concern about potential support from children in old age. The interpretation that emphasizes intergenerational altruism
re￿ects an implicit bounded rationality on the part of the parent. Alternative formulations according to which individuals
generate utility from the utility of their children, or from the actual aggregate income of their o⁄spring would require parental
predictions about fertility choices of their dynasty. These approaches would greatly complicate the model but they would not
a⁄ect the qualitative results.
62.2.2 Optimization
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t ￿ e c:
The optimization depends on whether the subsistence consumption constraint is binding. If income
is high enough, the constraint will not bind and the log-linearity of the utility function implies that ￿xed
shares of potential income are devoted to child rearing and consuming each of the two goods. However if
the subsistence consumption constraint binds then a greater share of potential income must be devoted to
agricultural consumption.
The consumption of the agricultural good, c
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(11)
The consumption of the manufactured good, c
i;m



















pt ￿ e c:
(12)
Furthermore, the number of educated and uneducated o⁄spring will be determined such that the aggregate
time devoted by a member i of generation t to child rearing is
(n
i;s
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2.3 Education and Fertility Decisions
This section demonstrates that in the early stages of development, when the technological level is relatively
low, individuals do not have an incentive to invest in the human capital of their o⁄spring. However, as the
level of technology improves in the process of development, the new industrial technology will ultimately
become economically viable, human capital will be demanded and individuals will have an incentive to invest
in the human capital of their o⁄spring.
















t = 0 if hm
t > (hm)￿:
Proof. The uniqueness of (hm)￿ follows from the properties of !(hm
t ), noting that ￿s=￿u > 0 . The remaining
part is a corollary of (14). ￿
Hence, if hm
t+1 < (hm)￿ then individuals would not have an incentive to raise unskilled o⁄spring and
the skilled to unskilled ratio will increase, whereas if hm
t+1 > (hm)￿ then individuals would not have an
incentive to raise skilled o⁄spring and the skilled to unskilled ratio will decline until hm
t+1 = (hm)￿:
Corollary 1 If the new industrial technology is employed then hm
t = (hm)￿, i.e.,
hm



















t > 0 and Y
m;N
t > 0:
2.4 Aggregate Labor Allocation
Since preferences are such that both goods are consumed in every period, in autarky both goods must be
produced in every period. Hence an equilibrium in the goods market requires that, in a given technological
state, the demand for the agricultural and the industrial goods given by (11) and (12) equal the supply of
the two goods given by (1)-(4).
Lemma 2 If both goods are produced only with the old technology
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Proof. Follows from (1), (3),(11)-(13), noting that wu




82.5 Viability of the New Technologies
The new industrial technology will become economically viable if the value of the marginal product of
unskilled workers who use this new technology, Am
t wu((hm)￿); is at least as high as that of unskilled workers
who use the old industrial technology, am
t .
The new agricultural technology will become economically viable if the value of the marginal product
of unskilled workers who use this new technology, ptAa
t, is at least as high as the return to unskilled workers




















t is given by Lemma 2.
Proof. (a) Y
m;N
t > 0 if the marginal productivity of unskilled labor in the new industrial sector is at least
as high as in the old industrial sector. Hence part (a) follows from (6) and Corollary 1.
(b) Y
a;N
t > 0 if the marginal productivity of unskilled labor in the new agricultural sector is at least
as high as in the old agricultural sector. Hence part (b) follows from (5). ￿
3 The Time Path of Macroeconomic Variables
3.1 Technological Progress
Suppose that technological progress, gt+1; that takes place between periods t and t+1 is a⁄ected positively





where g(ht) is an increasing concave function (g0(ht) > 0 and g00(ht) < 0): Furthermore, the rate of
technological progress is positive even if the labor force consists of only unskilled labor (i.e., g(0) > 0).18
Suppose that the productivity levels in each sector are functions of the level of a General Purpose
Technology in the economy as a whole. Namely, the productivity of the old and the new technologies in the









where, dAj=d￿ > 0 and daj=d￿ > 0; j = a;m:
17When Amwu(h￿
m) = am then there is indeterminacy in the choice of how many skilled and unskilled o⁄spring to produce.
This indeterminacy can be resolved by assuming that ceteris paribus parents prefer educated children. The indeterminacy
resolves itself after one period in any case as technology progresses.
18The qualitative analysis would not be altered if the growth rate of technology would a⁄ect the return to human capital. As
is established in Appendix B, if the agricultural technology remains land-intensive then it is the rate of growth of technology that
is vital. Although the threshold and the rate of growth models are theoretically distinct mechanisms, they are both consistent
with the same set of facts i.e. a growing rate of technological change occurring alongside an increase in the rate of human
capital accumulation and a non-monotonic relationship between population growth and income.
9The productivity parameters are restricted so as to assure that the process of technological progress
is consistent with its historical patterns:


















where N0 > 0 is the initial size of the adult population.
(b) The advancement in the productivity of the industrial sector is larger than that in the agricultural












d￿t > 0; lim￿t!1
A
j(￿t)
aj(￿t) = 1 j = a;m: (A2)
Condition A2 ensures that a more technologically advanced economy has a comparative advantage in the
industrial good.21
Lemma 4 Under A1, A2
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t )￿)￿￿1 8t ￿ (ta)￿;
where (L
a;0
t )￿ is the level of employment in the old agricultural sector necessary for the old agricultural
sector alone to satisfy the total demand for agricultural products at time t.
Proof. See Appendix. ￿
In order to simplify the determination of factor prices, the new agricultural technology is assumed to
become economically viable before the new industrial technology, i.e.,
(ta)￿ < (tm)￿; (A3)
This assumption assures that the static structure of the model resembles the Ricardo-Viner trade
model. In any period wages of skilled and unskilled workers are determined by either the constant marginal
productivity of unskilled labor in the old industrial sector (prior to the employment of the modern agricultural
19These assumptions are consistent with historical evidence that suggests that productivity in the agricultural sector grew less
rapidly than in the industrial sector over the late part of the 18th century and the entire 19th century. In particular, sectoral
productivity growth in the UK in the period 1780-1860 was estimated by McCloskey (1981) to be 1.8% in the modernized sector
and 0.45% in the agricultural sector. The gap was revised downward by Harley (1999) who estimate productivity growth in the
modernized sector to be 1.2% and 0.7% in the agricultural sector.
20Despite the fact that modern production technology is not employed over a certain period of time, the advancement in
knowledge permits the advancement in the productivity of this potential technology to be faster than the older one. For instance,
early vintages of the steam engines were very ine¢ cient and thus were not used. However, advancement in knowledge permitted
this technology to advance rather rapidly and to become e⁄ective. Namely, the advancement in the latent technology is via
learning by doing in the laboratory rather than in the industry.
21As follows from (9), condition A2 also has the implication that the relative price of the agricultural good is monotonically
increasing over time. Evidence suggests that the relative price of agricultural goods rose over the period 1880-1920 and declined
over the period 1920-1990 (Caselli and Coleman, 1999). This pattern can be easily matched if the cost of acquiring skills would
vary over time. In particular, if the cost of acquiring skills is increasing over time, (i.e. ￿s=￿u is increasing with ￿:), the relative
price of agricultural goods could decrease over time.
10technology), or the constant marginal productivity of unskilled workers in the agricultural sector (once the
modern agricultural technology is used). As established in the Appendix, the qualitative result would not
be a⁄ected if this structure is not imposed.
3.2 Human Capital Accumulation
The evolution of human capital accumulation is characterized by three regimes. In the time period t < (tm)￿;
as long as the new industrial technology is not economically viable, there is no demand for skilled individuals
and thus parents will not raise skilled children and the proportion of skilled labor in the labor force will
be zero. In the time interval (tm)￿ ￿ t ￿ ~ t, once the new industrial technology is economically viable, but
the subsistence consumption constraint is still binding for at least unskilled parents, skilled children will be
raised, and while the proportion of skilled labor in the industrial sector will be constant at a level, (hm)￿; the
proportion of skilled labor in the entire labor force, ht+1; will depend upon the demand for human capital
as re￿ ected by the level of technology, ￿t+1: Technological progress and its e⁄ect of household income will
gradually relax the bindingness of the subsistence agricultural consumption constraint, and will increase the
budget share that is devoted to the consumption of the industrial goods. It will therefore generate an increase
in the fraction of the labor force employed in the production of industrial goods, increasing the proportion
of skilled labor in the entire labor force. Finally, in the time interval t ￿ ~ t; once the subsistence consumption
constraint is no longer binding, technological advancements would not a⁄ect the budget share devoted to
any of the goods, and the proportion of skilled individuals in the entire labor force will be a constant at a
level ~ h:
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where h0(￿t+1) > 0:
Proof. See Appendix. ￿
Hence, as follows from Lemma 4, Lemma 5, and (15), the evolution of the proportion of skilled labor





0 if t < (tm)￿
h([1 + g(ht)]￿t) if (tm)￿ ￿ t ￿ ~ t
~ h if t ￿ ~ t;
(17)
where ~ t is the time period in which the subsistence consumption constraint is no longer binding even for
unskilled parents
3.3 Population Dynamics
The evolution of population is characterized by four regimes. In the time period t < (ta)￿; the economy is in
Malthusian regime where population growth is determined by the rate of technological progress. Technolog-
ical progress temporarily raises real wages, but in the absence of further technological advancements, these
gains are gradually eroded by population growth. Due to diminishing returns to labor in the agricultural
sector, population growth reduces real wages and future fertility until population growth falls to zero. In the
time period (ta)￿ < t < (tm)￿; the emergence of the new agricultural technology permits an advancement
of population without a reduction in real wages. Thus income per capita increases along with population
11growth. In the time period (tm)￿ < t < ~ t; the new technology in the industrial sector becomes viable but
the subsistence consumption constraint is still binding for at least unskilled parents. The rise in the demand
for human capital provides an incentive for parents to raise skilled children. Hence, a decline in the rate of
population growth eventually accompanies the rise in income per capita. Finally, in the time interval t ￿ ~ t;
once the subsistence consumption constraint is no longer binding, technological advancements do not a⁄ect
the budget share devoted to industrial production. The proportion of skilled individuals in the entire labor
force with constant at a level ~ h; and the rate of population growth is constant as well.
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where @￿
j=@Nt > 0 for all j = 1;2;3, @￿
j=@￿t > 0 for j = 1;2; and e n ￿ (1￿￿￿￿)[(1+(~ h=(1￿~ h))]=[(￿u+
(~ h=(1 ￿ ~ h))￿s]:
Proof. Follows from (13),(14), Lemma 5,and Lemma A1, noting that ￿s > ￿u. ￿
3.4 Industrialization and Demographic Transition
In advanced stages of development (i.e., t > (tm)￿ > (ta)￿); the new industrial technology is economically
viable and there is a demand for skilled labor. This stage of development is characterized by self-reinforcing
interaction between technological progress and the human capital intensity in the labor force. As established
in Lemma 5, the level of technology has a positive e⁄ect on the proportion of skilled labor in the entire labor
force, while the skill-intensity of the labor force governs the pace of technological advancement.
As established in the lemma below, technological progress generates two con￿ icting forces on the rate
of population growth. On the one hand, it raises the wage level and thus household￿ s income, increasing the
budget share devoted to manufactured goods, and therefore the demand for skilled workers. Hence, since
￿s > ￿u; technological progress provides an inducement for lower fertility rates.. However, on the other hand,
the rise in household￿ s income allows more resources to be devoted to raising children, exerting a positive
in￿ uence on the level of fertility.
Lemma 7 If the new technologies are economically viable in both sectors, and if the subsistence constraint
is binding for skilled and unskilled workers; then the total number of o⁄spring ni




(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ pte c=wi
t)[1 + (lu(￿t+1)=ls(￿t+1))(h(￿t+1)=(1 ￿ h(￿t+1)))]
[(1 ￿ ￿)(￿u + (lu(￿t+1)=ls(￿t+1)))(h(￿t+1)=(1 ￿ h(￿t+1))￿s)]
￿ ni(wi
t=pt;￿t+1):
Proof. Follows from the de￿nition of ht+1 in the proof of Lemma 5, noting (13). ￿
The theory generates the inverted ￿ U￿shaped pattern that characterizes the evolution of population
growth in the course of economic development.22 As established in (13), the rise in income in early stages
of development in which the subsistence consumption constraint is binding, increases the share of parental
time that is devoted to child rearing. However, since investment in education is not rewarded in this stages
of development, the entire increase in the share of parental time that is devoted to child rearing is allocated
towards an increase in the number of uneducated children. Hence, the rise in income per-capita in the take-o⁄
22Fertility will necessarily decline in the transition to the modern regime if ￿; ￿s; and !￿1(￿s=￿u); are su¢ ciently high.
12from the Malthusian epoch results in a gradual increase in population growth. The inevitable introduction
of the modern industrial technology brings about a demand for educated labor and the increasing parental
resources that are allocated to child rearing are devoted partially towards educated children. The gradual
increase in the reward to education shifts the allocation of resources toward child quality and population
growth ultimately declines.
3.5 The Modern Industrial Stage
In the modern industrial stage, the level of technology generates a su¢ ciently high income level for each
household such that the subsistence constraint is no longer binding. The economy reaches a state where
the population growth rate and the skill intensity of the economy are constant. The budget share devoted
to manufactured goods and the level of human capital accumulation is higher than in the previous stage of
development and the fertility rate is lower. The growth of income per capita is therefore higher, noting that
the rate of technological progress, gt+1 = g(ht); increases in the skill intensity of the labor force.
Proposition 1 If the new technologies are economically viable in both sectors and neither skilled nor un-
skilled workers are constrained by the subsistence constraint, the economy is in a state of balanced growth
with a constant population growth rate, ~ n = [(1￿￿￿￿)(1+(e h=(1￿e h))]=[￿u +(e h=(1￿e h))￿s]; and constant
skill intensity, e h:
Proof. Follows from (13), Lemma 5, and Lemma 7. ￿
Corollary 2 If the new technologies are economically viable in both sectors and neither skilled nor unskilled
workers are constrained by the subsistence constraint, the budget share devoted to manufactured goods and
the level of human capital accumulation will be higher than in the previous stages and the fertility rate will
be lower than the level in the previous stage.
Proof. Follows from (13), Lemmas A1, 5, and 7,. ￿
4 International Trade and the Process of Development
This section analyzes the e⁄ect of international trade on economies￿transition to a state of sustained economic
growth. The analysis demonstrates that international trade accelerates the transition of technologically
advanced economies to a state of sustained growth, whereas it prolongs the transition of less advanced
economies to a state of sustained economic growth, perhaps inde￿nitely.
4.1 Comparative Advantage
Suppose that the world economy consists of two economies that are identical in every respect except for
their level of technology. In particular, economy A is more technologically advanced than economy B and
therefore possesses more advanced technologies for the production of the industrial good as well as for the
agricultural good, i.e.,
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Furthermore, since technological progress in the industrial sector is faster than in the agricultural sector, the
industrial technology is relatively more advanced in economy A, and the technologically advanced country















4.2 Autarkic and Trade Equilibrium
Suppose that international trade does not take place prior to the stage in which the new production technolo-
gies become economically viable. As established above, since technological advancement is biased towards
the industrial sector, the autarkic relative price of the agricultural good, pA; in the technologically advanced
economy, A, is higher than the autarkic relative price, pB; in the less technologically advanced economy, B:
That is, as follows from (9) and Corollary 1, once the two advanced technologies are economically viable in
both economies, i.e., [Y
a;N
t ]i > 0 and [Y
m;N




























As international trade is established between the two countries, the international equilibrium relative
price of the agricultural good, p￿








4.3 Patterns of Specialization
International trade therefore causes each of the countries to specialize relative to their position in autarky.




t ; the two economies completely specialize in production).23 From the viewpoint of the
technologically advanced economy, A, there is reduction in the relative price of the agricultural good, and
producers are induced to produce more of the industrial good. From the viewpoint of the less advanced
economy, B; there is an increase in the relative price of the agricultural good and producers are induced to
produce more of the agricultural good. International trade, therefore induces economy A to specialize in
the production of the industrial, skilled intensive, good, whereas economy B is induced to specialize in the
production of the agricultural good.
4.4 Trade and Population Growth
The e⁄ect of international trade on the patterns of specialization in production in period t, a⁄ects the demand
for skilled and unskilled labor in the two economies in period t; and generates an advanced supply response
from parents who are taking decisions about the optimal number of skilled and unskilled children to raise in
period t ￿ 1 in light of the expected rate of return for skilled and unskilled workers in period t:
Proposition 2 If the world economy is opened to international trade:
(a) The rate of population growth of the technologically advanced economy, A; is a⁄ected negatively
(b) The rate of population growth of the technologically less advanced economy, B is a⁄ected positively.
23The patterns of comparative advantage determined by this semi-Ricardian structure is consistent with recent evidence






t , international trade increases necessarily the production of the skilled intensive
industrial good in economy A (even if the economy remains diversi￿ed). The ratio of skilled workers in the
economy [ht]A increases and since the production of skilled children requires more time, the rate of population
growth declines. In particular, if p￿
t < pA
t then economy A completely specializes in the production of the
industrial good, [hm




t , international trade increases necessarily the production of the unskilled intensive
agricultural good in economy B (even if the economy remains diversi￿ed). The ratio of skilled workers in
the economy [ht]B declines and since the production of unskilled children requires less time, the rate of
population growth rises. In particular, if pB
t < p￿
t then economy B completely specializes in the production
of the agricultural good, [hm
t ]B = 0 and population growth increases. ￿
Population growth in the two economies prior to the demographic transition is a⁄ected positively by
the aggregate resources of the economy and negatively by the rate of return to human capital. The e⁄ect of
international trade expedites the demographic transition in the technological advanced economy, A, whereas
it slows it down in the technologically less advanced economy, B.
Proposition 3 If the world economy is opened to International trade
(a) The demographic transition of the technologically advanced economy, A, is accelerated
(b) The demographic transition of the technologically less advanced economy, B, is delayed￿perhaps
inde￿nitely,
Proof. As established below in Proposition 4, international trade widens the technological gap between the
advanced and the less advanced economies. The relative income of economy B in the world economy depends
on its rate population growth relative to that of the advanced economy A: If the share of income of economy B
in the world economy falls over time then economy B could completely specialize in agricultural production,
and the economy would never generate a demand for skilled workers and would therefore not experience a
demographic transition. Alternatively if the relative share of income of economy B in the world economy
rises over time then ultimately the output of the manufactured good in economy A will be insu¢ cient to meet
world demand, and economy B would begin demanding skilled workers and eventually would experience a
demographic transition. For economy A international trade increases the rate of technological progress and
thereby the demand for skilled labor, accelerating the demographic transition. ￿
4.5 Trade and the Technological Gap
This initial e⁄ect of international trade on population growth will persist, and the initially less advanced
economy will become even relatively less advanced through time.
Proposition 4 International trade widens the technological gap between the advanced and less advanced
economies.
Proof. As follows from (15), the increase in the proportion of skilled workers [ht]A in the technologically
advanced economy increases the rate of technological progress in the economy, whereas the reduction in
the proportion of skilled workers [ht]B in the technologically less advanced economy, decreases its rate of
technological progress. Since g0(ht) > 0 the proposition follows. ￿
Corollary 3 International trade reinforces the initial patterns of comparative advantage.
154.6 The E⁄ect of Trade in a Multi-Country Setting
The model presented here is highly stylized. However the economic mechanisms derived in the paper would
still hold in more detailed models. In a model with more than two economies, for example, the e⁄ect of
trade on fertility and human capital in intermediate economies will depend on its overall trading position.
If trade increases an intermediate economy￿ s demand for human capital, via its comparative advantage in
human capital intensive goods with less developed economies, then trade will accelerate the intermediate
economy￿ s transition to the modern industrial stage for the reasons derived in Proposition 3. Thus the model
is consistent with the rapid growth of intermediate economies, such as the Asian Tigers, even without the
presence of complementary industrial policies.
5 Cross Country Evidence
This section uses cross country regressions to examine empirically the hypothesis that the e⁄ect of inter-
national trade on the demand for human capital induces a rise in fertility and a decline in human capital
formation in non-industrial economies, and a decline in fertility and a rise in human capital formation in
industrialized economies.
The empirical analysis focuses on a recent time period in which most countries have already expe-
rienced their demographic transition. In particular, we examine the e⁄ect of the share of trade in GDP
in 1985 on Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and on the change in the average years of schooling in industrial
and non-industrial economies over the time period 1985-1990.24 The choice of this time period re￿ ects the
desirability of the use of the Frankel and Romer (1999) instrument for a country￿ s intrinsic propensity to
trade in 1985, so as to overcome the potential existence of omitted variables, measurement errors, and reverse
causality from fertility and human capital formation to trade patterns. In the absence of authoritative data
on the factor content of trade that would have enabled us to divide the world into economies which export
human capital intensive goods and those which export unskilled labor intensive goods, we test our hypothesis
on a pre-existing division of the world economy, and consider OECD economies in 1985 as those who export
on average human capital intensive goods and non-OECD economies in 1985 as those who export unskilled
intensive goods.25 The sample consists of 132 countries for the fertility regressions and 97 countries for the
human capital accumulation regressions.26
The theory suggests that international trade, via its e⁄ect on the patterns of specialization, would
increase the demand for human capital in the OECD economies and decrease the demand for human capital
in non-OECD economics. This would generate a force towards a decline in fertility rates and an increase in
human capital investment in OECD economies and towards a rise in fertility rates and a decline in human
capital investment in non-OECD economies. The gains from international trade, however, would be expected
to generate a rise in income in both OECD and non-OECD countries. In the pre-demographic transition
24See the Appendix for the de￿nitions and summary statistics of all variables.
25Tre￿er and Zhu (2005) provide supporting evidence for this segmentation and the underlying di¢ culties in estimating the
factor content of trade.
26OPEC economies are omitted from the sample since their trade patterns do not capture the characteristics underlined by
the theory and the wealth e⁄ect associated with their oil revenues could potentially distort the relationship between trade,
fertility and education. In addition, Reunion is excluded from the sample since it is an integral part of the French Republic and
is thus not an independent observation. The incorporation of OPEC economies and Reunion into the analysis, or the inclusion
of a dummy variable for OPEC economies does not alter the qualitative results.
16era these gains in income would be channeled towards an increase in fertility rates. They would therefore
enhance the increase in fertility rates in less developed economies and would o⁄set some of the negative e⁄ect
of the rise in the demand for human capital on fertility in developed economies.
However, in the post-demographic transition era, which is the time period that characterizes our
data, the rise in income due to international trade generates, at the parental level, con￿ icting income and
substitution e⁄ects with respect to the optimal number of children and their quality. Although, according
to the theory, these e⁄ects o⁄set one another, the rise in households￿income increases the relative demand
for human capital intensive goods (as the subsistence agricultural consumption constraint is satis￿ed) and
generates a force towards a decline in fertility and a rise in human capital investment in non-OECD economies
as well as in OECD economies that have not reached their balanced growth path. Thus, in the post-
demographic transition era, the overall e⁄ect of international trade on fertility in OECD economies would be
expected to be negative, whereas the overall e⁄ect of trade on fertility in non-OECD economies is a⁄ected
by two con￿ icting forces. Controlling for income, however, the e⁄ect of trade on fertility is predicted to be
positive in non-OECD economies and negative in OECD economies. Similarly, controlling for income, the
e⁄ect of trade on human capital formation is predicted to be negative in non-OECD economies and positive
in OECD economies. Furthermore, some of the variation in fertility rates across countries would re￿ ect
variation in infant mortality rates. As long as parents generate utility from the number of surviving children,
the theory predicts that infant mortality rates have a positive e⁄ect on fertility rates in both OECD and
non-OECD economies.
5.1 The E⁄ect of Trade on Fertility
Table 1 presents the outcome of linear regressions of the e⁄ects of the share of trade in GDP in 1985 on the
average Total Fertility Rate in the period 1985-1990 in OECD and non-OECD countries. The regressions
provide support for the hypothesis that international trade generates opposing e⁄ects on fertility rates in
OECD and non-OECD economies. Columns (1) and (5) present the results from OLS regressions of average
Total Fertility Rate in the period 1985-1990 on the log of the share of trade in GDP in 1985 for non-OECD
and OECD economies, respectively, controlling for the log of GDP per capita in 1985. The regressions
show that the signs of the association between fertility and trade are those predicted by the theory, being
positive in non-OECD and negative in OECD economies, although, re￿ ecting the potential existence of
omitted variables, measurement errors, and reverse causality, these associations are statistically insigni￿cant.
Moreover, these regressions indicate that indeed our sample consists of economies in the post-demographic
transition era, where fertility is negatively associated with income per capita. Consistent with the theory, this
negative association is of larger magnitude and statistical signi￿cance among non-OECD economies that have
experienced the onset of the demographic transition more recently. Columns (2) and (6) present the results
from OLS regressions of fertility on trade for non-OECD and OECD economies, respectively, controlling for
the log of GDP per capita in 1985 and for the average infant mortality rate in the period 1985-1990. The
regressions show that in accordance with the theory, the association between fertility and trade is positive
and signi￿cant at the 5% level in non-OECD and negative and insigni￿cant in OECD economies.
Once the in￿ uence of the potential existence of omitted variables, measurement errors, and reverse
17causality, is controlled for by instrumenting for the share of trade in GDP in 1985 with the Frankel-Romer
instrument, then as predicted by the theory, columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) demonstrate that the e⁄ect of
trade on fertility is positive and signi￿cant in non-OECD economies and negative and signi￿cant in OECD
economies. Controlling for the log of GDP per capita in 1985, in column (3), and for the infant mortality
rates as well, in column (4), trade has a positive e⁄ect on fertility in non-OECD economies, and this e⁄ect
is signi￿cant at the 1% level.27 Moreover, as reported in column (7) and (8), trade has a negative e⁄ect on
fertility in OECD economies, that is statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level if only income is controlled for,
and at the 5% level if both income and infant mortality is controlled.28
Using the results in column (4) of Table 1 for non-OECD economies, the elasticity of fertility with
respect to trade share is 0.70/TFR. The average level of TFR for non-OECD countries is 4.84 and thus the
elasticity is about 0.15. Thus if a non-OECD economy doubled its trade share, then fertility would rise by
15% or by 0.7 of a child per woman.29 The same calculation for OECD economies, using the results from
column (8) of Table 1, yields an elasticity of -0.13/1.76 = -0.07. In this case, a doubling of trade would lead
to a reduction in fertility of 0.13 of a child per woman.
Interestingly the inclusion of an instrumental variable for trade share reinforces the opposing e⁄ects
of trade on fertility in OECD and non-OECD economies. For the non-OECD economies, the use of an
instrumental variable increases the size and signi￿cance of the positive e⁄ect of trade on fertility, whereas
for OECD economies, the use of an instrumental variable increases the size and signi￿cance of the negative
e⁄ect of trade on fertility.
27Importantly, the results remain nearly identical if we exclude the control for income per capita in column (4) and (8).
Namely, the overall e⁄ect of trade (directly and indirectly via income) is 0.65 (0.19) in non-OECD economies and -0.14 (0.06)
for OECD economies. Moreover, the exclusion of Eastern European economies slightly increases the coe¢ cient on trade in
column (4) of Table 1 to 0.71, which remains signi￿cant at the 1% level. The inclusion of OPEC economies slightly reduces
the coe¢ cient to 0.69, which remains signi￿cant at the 1% level. Moreover, if the sample of non-OECD economies is restricted
to the 74 countries sample used in Table 2 for the analysis of the e⁄ect of trade on education, the qualitative results remain
intact. The coe¢ cient for trade becomes .77 with a p value of 0.004.
28The qualitative results will not be a⁄ected if the dependent variable will be based on of the average TFR over the longer
time intervals 1985-1995. The point estimate on the e⁄ect of trade in non-OECD economies will be nearly identical (0.70) and
the e⁄ect remains signi￿cant at the 1% level, and in OECD economies it will be -0.08, and signi￿cant at the 10% level. The
e⁄ect on the average TFR over even a longer time interval, 1985-2000, is not surprisingly weaker. It is nearly identical for
non-OECD economies (0.68 and signi￿cant at the 1% level), and still negative, but insigni￿cant for OECD economies. The use
of the average Crude Birth Rates over the period 1985-1990 as a dependent variable does not a⁄ect the qualitative results as
well. The e⁄ect of trade is positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level for non-OECD economies, and negative and signi￿cant at
nearly 5% level for OECD economies.
29Note that the measure of trade is share of trade in GDP and this ranges from 13.16 (Myanmar) to 318.07 (Singapore).
Thus, it is reasonable to consider a doubling of trade share.
18Table 1: The E⁄ect of Trade on Total Fertility Rate
Average Total Fertility Rate (TFR), 1985-1990
Non-OECD Economies OECD Economies
OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(Trade/GDP) 1985 0:21 0:33
￿￿ 0:69
￿￿￿ 0:70
￿￿￿ ￿0:12 ￿0:04 ￿0:23
￿￿￿ ￿0:13
￿￿




￿ ￿0:53 0:14 ￿0:53
￿ 0:10
(0:14) (0:27) (0:15) (0:25) (0:35) (0:23) (0:32) (0:23)





1985-90 (0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:006)
Number of countries 108 108 108 108 24 24 24 24
R
2 0:58 0:72 0:55 0:71 0:29 0:62 0:27 0:60
(i) Regressions (3), (4), (7) and (8) employ the Frankel-Romer IV for log of trade share in GDP in 1985
(ii) Robust standard errors in parentheses
(iii) One sided tests are performed that the coe¢ cients on trade are of the predicted sign.
(iv) ￿￿￿denotes signi￿cance at the 1% level ￿￿signi￿cance at the 5% level and ￿signi￿cance at the 10% level.
The IV regressions use Frankel and Romer (1999)￿ s instrument for the country￿ s intrinsic propensity to
trade. This instrument is generated by aggregating the results from thousands of bilateral trade relationships
which are estimated using a regression of bilateral trade share in GDP on seven variables and some of their
interactions. These seven variables are the bilateral distance between the two trading economies, a dummy
for whether there is a common border between the two trading economies, a dummy for whether one or
more economy is landlocked and the country size variables, log area and log population for both countries.
In Frankel and Romer￿ s analysis, income per capita is the dependent variable in the ￿nal stage. They argue
that the ￿rst three variables do not a⁄ect income per capita directly, only via trade, and so they exclude
them from their ￿nal stage regressions. For the country size variables, they argue that these variables do
have a direct e⁄ect on income per capita, via within country trade, and hence they include a country￿ s log
area and log population as exogenous variables in the ￿nal stage of their model. In our regressions, however,
fertility and human capital accumulation are the dependent variables and, consistently with our theory, it
appears that they will not be a⁄ected directly by the country￿ s area or population size.30 They will be
a⁄ected indirectly by these variables, via their e⁄ect on income per capita, but income is controlled for in
our regression. Hence, following Frankel and Romer￿ s reasoning, all ￿rst stage variables are excluded from
the ￿nal stage regressions.31
30The data set is from the post-Malthusian era where country size does not in￿uence fertility. Furthermore, it should be
noted that even in the Malthusian steady state, fertility is una⁄ected by a country size.
31Although there are compelling reasons to exclude these variables from the second stage of the IV regressions, it should
be noted that the qualitative results of the IV regressions (4) and (8) will not be a⁄ected by the inclusion of controls for log
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Figure 1b: The partial e⁄ect of trade on fertility in OECD economies
The main hypothesis of the theory regarding the di⁄erential e⁄ect of trade on fertility rates in devel-
oped and less developed economies is con￿rmed by the evidence presented in Table 1 and more formally in
Table 3. The di⁄erences in the e⁄ect of trade on fertility in OECD and non-OECD economies is illustrated
in Figures 1a and 1b which plot the partial e⁄ect of trade on fertility from the regressions in columns (4)
(signi￿cant at the 5% level in a one sided test), whereas in column (8) it will be -0.56 (signi￿cant at the 1% level in the one-sided
test).
20and (8) of Table 1.32
5.2 The E⁄ect of Trade on Education
Table 2 presents the outcome of linear regressions of the e⁄ect of the log of the share of trade in GDP in
1985 on human capital accumulation in the period 1985-1990 in OECD and non-OECD countries. These
regressions provide support for the hypothesis that international trade generates opposing e⁄ects on human
capital accumulation in OECD and non-OECD economies. Columns (1) and (3) present the results from
OLS regressions of the change in the average years of education over the period 1985-1990 (for a population
above the age of 15 ) on the log of share of trade in GDP in 1985 for non-OECD and OECD economies,
respectively, controlling for the log of GDP per capita in 1985. The regressions show that the signs of the
association between education and trade are those predicted by the theory, being negative in non-OECD
and positive in OECD economies. Re￿ ecting the potential existence of omitted variables, measurement
errors, and reverse causality, these associations are statistically insigni￿cant for non-OECD economies and
signi￿cant only at the 10% level for OECD economies. Once the in￿ uence of the potential existence of
omitted variables, measurement errors, and reverse causality is controlled for by instrumenting for the share
of trade in GDP in 1985 with the Frankel-Romer instrument, then as predicted by the theory, columns (2)
and (4) demonstrate that the e⁄ect of trade on education is negative and signi￿cant at the 5% level for
non-OECD economies and positive and signi￿cant at the 5% level for OECD economies.33
Interestingly the inclusion of an instrumental variable for trade share reinforces the opposing e⁄ects
of trade on education in OECD and non-OECD economies. For the non-OECD economies, the use of an
instrumental variable increases the size and signi￿cance of the negative e⁄ect of trade on education, whereas
for OECD economies, the use of an instrumental variable increases the size and signi￿cance of the positive
e⁄ect of trade on education.
32It should be noted that given that only 24 countries belong to our sample of OECD economies in 1985, the signi￿cance
of the negative e⁄ect of trade on fertility should be expected to be fragile to the exclusion of some countries from the sample.
Nevertheless, if in Regression (7), the outliers of Luxemburg, Iceland, and Ireland are excluded together or in any feasible
pairwise or individual permutation, the e⁄ect of trade remains negative and statistically signi￿cant at least at the 5% level. If
in Regression (8), the outliers of Luxemburg, Iceland, and Ireland are excluded together the e⁄ect of trade remains negative
and statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level. If any feasible pairwise permutation of these three countries is excluded, the results
remain signi￿cant at least at the 10% level (in the one sided test). If only Luxemburg is excluded from regression (8) the e⁄ect
of trade remain negative but insigni￿cant. (If controls for log area and log population are included the signi￿cance at the 5%
level is restored). However, as established in the combined sample in Tables 3, even if Luxemburg is excluded from the sample,
trade has a signi￿cantly di⁄erent e⁄ect on fertility in OECD and non-OECD economies.
33The qualitative results are una⁄ected if Eastern European economies are excluded from the sample or OPEC economies are
included in it. The exclusion of Eastern European economies slightly reduces the coe¢ cient on trade in column (2) of Table 2 to
-0.26, which remains signi￿cant at the 5% level. The inclusion of OPEC economies reduces the coe¢ cient to -0.16, (signi￿cant
at the 1% level). Furthermore, the qualitative results will not be a⁄ected if the dependent variable will be the change in average
years primary school (of the population above the age 15) over the period 1985-1990. The e⁄ect of trade on education in
non-OECD economies will negative and signi￿cant at the 5% level, and in OECD positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level in a
one-sided test. Moreover, in the IV regression (2) the results will not be a⁄ected by the inclusion of the excluded control for
log population in 1985. The point estimate of the e⁄ect of log trade share in GDP will become much larger in absolute value
(-0.49) (signi￿cant at the 5% level). If a control for log area will be added, the e⁄ect will remain negative but insigni￿cant.
In addition, the qualitative results of the IV regression (4) will not be a⁄ected by the inclusion of the excluded control for log
area. The point estimate of the e⁄ect of log trade share in GDP will become (1.08) signi￿cant at the 10% level in a one sided
test). If a control for log population will be added, the e⁄ect will remain positive but insigni￿cant. As discussed above, there
are compelling reasons to exclude these variables from the second stage of the IV regressions
21Table 2: The E⁄ect of Trade on Education
Changes in the Average Years of Education, 1985-1990
Non-OECD Economies OECD Economies
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)








(0:06) (0:07) (0:25) (0:22)
Number of countries 74 74 23 23
R
2 0:05 0:01 0:08 0:08
The e⁄ect of the share of trade in GDP in 1985 on the change in the average years of total education
(for population above the age 15) in the periods: 1985-1990
(i) Regressions (2) and (4) employ the Frankel-Romer IV for log of trade share in GDP in 1985
(ii) Robust standard errors in parentheses
(iii) One sided tests that the coe¢ cients on trade are of the predicted sign.
(iv) ￿￿￿denotes signi￿cance at the 1% level ￿￿signi￿cance at the 5% level ￿signi￿cance at the 10% level.
The signi￿cantly di⁄erent e⁄ect of trade on education in OECD and non-OECD economies which is
established more formally in Table 4, is illustrated in Figures 2a and 2b which plot the partial e⁄ect of trade
on human capital accumulation from the regressions in columns (2) and (4) of Table 2. 34
34Given that only 23 countries belong to our sample of OECD economies in 1985, the signi￿cance of the negative e⁄ect of
trade on human capital accumulation should be expected to be fragile to the exclusion of some countries from the sample.
Nevertheless, if in Regression (4), Norway, that appears to be an outlier, is excluded, the e⁄ect of trade remains positive and
statistically signi￿cant at the 10% level in the one-sided test. If in addition, Finland is excluded, the e⁄ect of trade still remains
positive and nearly signi￿cant at the 10% level in the one-sided test. Furthermore, as established in the combined sample in
Tables 4, even if Finland and Norway are excluded from the sample, trade has a signi￿cantly di⁄erent e⁄ect on education in
OECD and non-OECD economies. In the non-OECD sample if two possible outliers (Zimbabwe and Pakistan) are excluded
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Figure 2b: The partial e⁄ect of trade on education in OECD economies
5.3 Robustness
5.3.1 Robustness of the Di⁄erential E⁄ect of Trade on Fertility
This section con￿rms the hypothesis that the di⁄erential e⁄ect of trade on fertility in OECD and non-OECD
economies is statistically signi￿cant and robust. Using the entire sample, it shows that the e⁄ect of trade
23on fertility is signi￿cantly more negative in OECD economies Moreover, it establishes that this di⁄erential
e⁄ect of trade on fertility is robust to various changes in the regression￿ s speci￿cation as detailed below.
The two sub-samples used in the separate regressions displayed in Table 1 can be combined into a
single regression model of the form
TFRi = ￿0+￿1 ln(tr=GDP)i+￿2 lnGDPi+￿3mi+￿4Di+￿5Di ln(tr=GDP)i+￿6Di lnGDPi+￿7Dimi+ei
(23)
Thus, TFRi; the average Total Fertility Rate in the period 1985-1990 in economy i; is regressed on the
country￿ s: (a) log share of trade in GDP in 1985, (tr=GDP)i, instrumented by the Frankel-Romer instrument
for trade; (b) log GDP per capita in 1985, lnGDPi; (c) infant mortality rate in 1985, mi; (d) a dummy
variable, Di, which equals 1 if economy i is an OECD economy and 0 otherwise, and (e) the interactions
between the OECD dummy, Di and ln(tr=GDP)i, lnGDPi and mi.35 This model has the bene￿t of using
all the information in the data set to test whether the relationship between the variables di⁄ers signi￿cantly
between these two sub-samples.
Table 3 con￿rms the hypothesis that the di⁄erential e⁄ect of trade on fertility in OECD and non-
OECD economies is statistically signi￿cant, robust and stable. Column (1) displays the results of the e⁄ect
of the log of the share of trade in GDP in 1985 on the average Total Fertility Rate in the period 1985-
1990 in the entire sample, controlling for log of GDP per capita in 1985 and the average infant mortality
rate in the period 1985-1990. As predicted by the theory, this regression shows that the e⁄ect of trade
on fertility is positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level in the non-OECD economies and signi￿cantly more
negative in OECD economies (i.e., the coe¢ cient on the interactions between the OECD dummy and trade
is negative and signi￿cant at the 1% level). Regressions (2)-(8) demonstrates that the baseline regression
(1) is remarkably robust and stable to (a) the inclusion of continental dummies, interacted with the OECD
dummy (column (2)), (b) the inclusion of OPEC economies in the sample (column (3)), (c) the exclusion
of Eastern European economies from the sample (column (4)), (d) the exclusion of the outlier identi￿ed in
Figure 1b - Luxemburg (column (5)), (e) the replacement of the dependent variable by the average Total
Fertility Rate over a longer time interval, 1985-1995 (column (6)), (f) the replacement of the dependent
variable by average Total Fertility Rate over the longer period, 1985-2000 (column (7)), (g) the replacement
of the dependent variable by average Crude Birth Rate in 1985-1990 (column (8)). In all these regressions,
the e⁄ect of trade on fertility is positive, remarkably stable (ranging from 0.64 to 0.71), and signi￿cant at
the 1% level in non-OECD economies, and is signi￿cantly more negative and very stable (ranging from -0.71
to -0.84) in OECD economies (i.e., the coe¢ cient on the interactions between the OECD dummy and trade
is negative and signi￿cant at the 1% level).36 In addition the results are nearly identical if the sample is
35The relationships estimated in this model are precisely the same as those from two separate regressions on the two sub-
samples, with the parameters for the separate regressions of Table 1 given by ￿0;￿1, ￿2, and ￿3, for the subsample of non-OECD
countries, and by ￿0 + ￿4;￿1 + ￿5 and ￿2 + ￿6, and ￿3 + ￿7 for the subsample of OECD countries. See for example Greene
(1997) Chapter 8.
36Clearly, the coe¢ cients in regression (8) that uses Crude Birth Rates di⁄er from those in regressions (1)-(7) that uses
TFR. As discussed above, although there are compelling reasons to exclude the log area and log population from the second
stage of the IV regressions, it should be noted that the qualitative results will not be a⁄ected by the inclusion of controls for
log population in 1985 and log area. For instance, in the baseline regression in column (1), the e⁄ect of trade on fertility in
non-OECD economies is positive and signi￿cant at the 5% level, and it is signi￿cantly more negative (at the 5% level) for OECD
economies. In Regression (2)-(7), the results remains at least signi￿cant at the 10% level. In regression (8) the results remain
signi￿cant as long as Eastern European countries are excluded or continental dummies are included.
24restricted to the 97 countries, used in Table 4, in the baseline examination of the e⁄ect of trade on education.
Table 3. IV Regressions of the E⁄ect of Trade on Fertility - Robustness
Total Fertility Rate CBR
1985-90 1985-90 1985-90 1985-90 1985-90 1985-95 1985-2000 1985-90
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(0:34) (0:35) (0:32) (0:35) (0:34) (0:31) (0:29) (2:05)









(0:005) (0:005) (0:004) (0:005) (0:005) (0:004) (0:004) (0:02)
DOECD x Infant Mort ￿0:005 ￿0:002 ￿0:011 ￿0:004 ￿0:004 ￿0:005 ￿0:006 0:07
(0:007) (0:007) (0:007) (0:007) (0:007) (0:006) (0:006) (0:05)
DOECD ￿2:04 ￿1:87 1:80 ￿2:34 ￿2:52 ￿3:18 ￿3:56 ￿33:07
￿
(3:28) (3:27) (3:10) (3:29) (3:28) (2:97) (2:77) (20:00)
Continental Dummies Yes
Including OPEC Yes
Excluding East Euro Yes
Excluding outliers Yes
Number of countries 132 132 144 126 131 132 132 132
R
2 0:81 0:82 0:77 0:80 0:80 0:82 0:83 0:85
The e⁄ect of the share of trade in GDP in 1985 on the average Total Fertility Rate in: 1985-90 ((1)-(5)),
1985-95 ((6)), and 1985-2000 ((7)), and on the average Crude Birth Rates (CBR), 1985-90 ((8)).
(i) All regressions employ the Frankel-Romer IV for the log of trade share in GDP in 1985.
(ii) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(iii) One sided tests that the coe¢ cients on trade and its interactions are of the predicted sign.
(iv)
￿￿￿denotes signi￿cance at the 1% level ￿￿signi￿cance at the 5% level ￿signi￿cance at the 10% level.
5.3.2 Robustness of the Di⁄erential E⁄ect of Trade on Education
This section con￿rms the hypothesis that the di⁄erential e⁄ect of trade on education in OECD and non-
OECD economies is statistically signi￿cant and robust. It shows that the e⁄ect of trade on education in the
entire sample is signi￿cantly more positive in OECD economies Moreover, it establishes that this di⁄erential
e⁄ect of trade on education is robust to various changes in the regression￿ s speci￿cation as detailed below.
The two sub-samples used in the separate regressions displayed in Table 2 can be combined into a
25single regression model of the form
HCi = ￿0 + ￿1 lnGDPi + ￿2 ln(trade=GDP)i + ￿3Di + ￿4Di lnGDPi + ￿5Di ln(trade=GDP)i + ei (24)
where HCi is the change in the years of education of the population, above 15, in the period 1985-1990.
Table 4 con￿rms the hypothesis that the di⁄erential e⁄ect of trade on education in OECD and non-
OECD economies is statistically signi￿cant, robust and stable. Column (1) displays the results of the e⁄ect
of the log of the share of trade in GDP in 1985 on the change in the average years of total education over the
period 1985-1990 (for a population above the age of 15) for the entire sample. As predicted by the theory,
the regression shows that the e⁄ect of trade on education is signi￿cantly negative in non-OECD economies
and signi￿cantly more positive in OECD economies (i.e., the coe¢ cient on the interactions between the
OECD dummy and trade is positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level). Regressions (2)-(8) demonstrate that
the baseline regression (1) is robust and stable to (a) the inclusion of continental dummies, interacted with
the OECD dummy (column (2)), (b) the inclusion of OPEC economies in the sample (column (3)), (c) the
exclusion of Eastern European economies from the sample (column (4)), (d) the exclusion of the outliers
identi￿ed in Figure 2b - Norway and Finland (column (5)), (e) the replacement of the dependent variable by
the change in the average years of total education over a longer time interval, 1985-1995 (column (6)), (f)
the replacement of the dependent variable by the average years of total education over a longer time interval,
1985-2000 (column (7)), (g) the replacement of the dependent variable by the change in the average years
of primary education, 1985-1990 (column (8)). In all these regressions, the e⁄ect of trade on education is
negative and signi￿cant in non-OECD economies, and it is signi￿cantly more positive in OECD economies
(i.e., the coe¢ cient on the interactions between the OECD dummy and trade is positive and signi￿cant).37
Interestingly, the e⁄ect of trade on education is stronger over longer time intervals (1985-1995 and 1985-
2000), re￿ ecting the fact that the formation of human capital is time-intensive. In contrast, the e⁄ect of
trade on fertility is slightly lower over longer time intervals, re￿ ecting the faster realization of the response
37As discussed above there are compelling reasons to exclude the log area and log population from the second stage of the IV
regressions. The qualitative results in the baseline regression will not be a⁄ected by the inclusion of controls for log population
in 1985. If both log area and long population in 1985 are included the e⁄ect of trade on education is still negative (but
insigni￿cant) in non-OECD economies and it is still more positive in OECD economies.
26of fertility for economic incentives.
Table 4. IV Regressions of the E⁄ect of Trade on Education - Robustness
Changes in the Average Years of
Total Education Primary
1985-90 1985-90 1985-90 1985-90 1985-90 1985-95 1985-2000 1985-90
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(2:66) (2:84) (2:65) (2:66) (2:07) (2:61) (2:71) (0:98)
Continental Dummies Yes
Including OPEC Yes
Excluding east. Europe Yes
Excluding outliers Yes
Number of countries 97 97 104 95 95 96 96 97
R
2 0:03 0:05 0:03 0:07 0:04 0:06 0:10 0:09
The e⁄ect of the share of trade in GDP in 1985 on the changes in the average years of total education
(for population above the age 15) in the periods: 1985-1990 ((1)-(5)), 1985-1995 ((6)), and 1985-2000 ((7)),
and on the changes in average years of primary education, 1985-1990 ((8)).
(i) All regressions employ the Frankel-Romer IV for the log of trade share in GDP in 1985.
(ii) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(iii) One sided tests that the coe¢ cients on trade and its interactions are of the predicted sign.
(iv)
￿￿￿denotes signi￿cance at the 1% level ￿￿signi￿cance at the 5% level ￿signi￿cance at the 10% level.
6 Historical Evidence
Historical evidence indicates that the fundamental hypothesis of this research is consistent with the process
of development of the last two centuries and in particular with the diverging experience in terms of the levels
of income per capita and population growth rates of the UK and India since the nineteenth century. The
historical evidence described in this section suggests that indeed the asymmetric e⁄ect of international trade
on the timing of the demographic transition in developed and less-developed economies, and its persistent
e⁄ect, therefore, on the initial patterns of comparative advantage may be an important element behind the
Great Divergence over the last two centuries.
The historical analysis highlights in particular the contrasting process of development of the UK and
27India over the last two centuries. The evidence demonstrates that during the nineteenth century the UK
traded manufactured goods for primary products with India.38 Consistent with the proposed hypothesis,
industrialization in India regressed over this century whereas industrialization in the UK accelerated. The
process of industrialization in the UK led to a signi￿cant increase in the demand for skilled labor in the
second phase of the industrial revolution, triggering a demographic transition and a transition to a state
of sustained economic growth. In India, in contrast, the lack of demand for skilled labor delayed the
demographic transition and the process of development. Thus, while the gains from trade were utilized
in the UK primarily towards an increase in output per capita, in India they were more biased towards an
increase in the size of the population.39
6.1 North-South Trade and Industrialization
Consistent with the main hypothesis of this research, during the 19th century, North-South trade, as well as
North-North trade, expanded signi￿cantly due to a rapid industrialization in Northwest Europe as well as to
the reduction of trade barriers and transportation costs and the bene￿ts of the gold standard. The ratio of
world trade to output was about 2% in 1800, but then it rose to 10% in 1870, to 17% in 1900 and 21% in 1913
(Estavadeordal, Frantz and Taylor, 2002). While much of this trade occurred between industrial economies
a signi￿cant proportion was between industrial and non-industrial economies. As shown in Table 5, before
1900 nearly 50% of manufactured exports were to non-European and non-North American economies and
by the end of 19th Century a clear pattern of specialization had emerged. The UK and Northwest Europe
were net importers of primary products and net exporters of manufactured goods, whereas the exports of
Asia, Oceania, Latin America and Africa were overwhelmingly composed of primary products. (Findlay and
O￿ Rourke, 2001).
Atlantic trade as well as trade with Asia, in an era of colonialism, had major e⁄ects on European
growth starting in the late 16th century (Acemoglu et al., 2005). Furthermore, later expansion of inter-
national trade bene￿ted and contributed further to the process of industrialization in the UK and Europe
(Mokyr, 1985; Crafts and Thomas, 1986; O￿ Rourke and Williamson, 1999). For the UK, the proportion of
foreign trade to national income grew from about 10% in the 1780￿ s to about 26% in the period 1837-45,
and 51% in the period 1909-13 (Kuznets, 1967). Other European economies experienced a similar pattern
as well. The proportion of foreign trade to national income on the eve of World War I was 54% in France,
38% in Germany , 34% in Italy, and 40% in Sweden (Kuznets, 1967). Furthermore, exports were critical for
the viability of some industries, especially the cotton industry, where 70% of the UK output was exported in
the 1870￿ s (Mokyr, 1989). Thus while technological advances could have spawned the industrial revolution
without an expansion of international trade, the growth in exports increased the pace of industrialization
and the growth rate of output per capita. Moreover, Pomeranz (2000), provides historical evidence for the
38The theory is compatible with the case in which the patterns of specialization are not determined by market forces but rather
by the interaction between colonial forces and international trade. Colonialism reinforced the adverse e⁄ect of international
trade on the process of industrialization of less developed economies, depressing the demand for human capital and enhancing
the incentive to convert the gains from trade into population growth rather than into an increase in output per capita.
39Consistent with the viewpoint that trade has not been uniformly bene￿cial across time and regions, recent research has
indicated that the relationship between openness and growth changed in the last century. For example Clemens and Williamson
(2004) and Vamvakadis (2002) ￿nd a negative relationship between openness and growth for the period 1870-1913 and a
negative relationship for the period 1970-1998.
28vital role of trade in the ￿ take o⁄￿of the European economies. He argues that technological and development
di⁄erences between Europe and Asia were minor around 1750, but the discovery of the New World enabled
Europe, via Atlantic trade, to overcome ￿ land constraints￿and to take-o⁄ technologically.40
Non-industrialized economies were an important market for the export of the industrial economies,
as exhibited in Table 5. Trade with Asia was especially signi￿cant for Britain. According to Bairoch (1974)
trade with Asia constituted over 20% of UK total exports throughout the nineteenth century. In contrast,
trade with Asia was only 5% or less of French, German or Italian exports. UK imports from Asia were
also much more important for the UK than for Europe. Bairoch estimates that 23% of UK imports were
originated in Asian countries in 1860 as compared with 12% for continental Europe.
Table 5. Regional Shares of World Trade in Manufactures
1876-1880 1896-1900 1913
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
U.K. and Ireland 37.8% 9.1% 31.5% 10.4% 25.3% 8.2%
Northwest Europe 47.1% 18.1% 45.8% 20.3% 47.9% 24.4%
Other Europe 9.2% 13.3% 10.3% 12.2% 8.3% 15.4%
U.S. and Canada 4.4% 7.7% 7.4% 9.6% 10.6% 12.1%
Rest of the World 1.5% 51.8% 5.0% 47.5% 7.9% 39.9%
Source:Yates (1959).
For India, however, international trade played the reverse role. As Chaudhuri (1983) describes, 1813-
1850 was a period of a rapid expansion in the volume of exports and imports which gradually transformed
India from being an exporter of manufactured products ￿largely textiles ￿into a supplier of primary com-
modities. Trade with the UK was fundamental in this process, as Table 6 demonstrates, with the UK
supplying over two thirds of its imports for most of the nineteenth century and being the market for over a
third of its exports. Bairoch￿ s (1974, 1982) analysis of international levels of industrialization and interna-
tional trade supports the viewpoint that international trade was associated with a decrease in the per capita
level of industrialization in India.
Table 6. Share of the Value of British Trade in Total Value of Indian Trade
1828-9 1839-40 1850-1 1860-1 1880-1 1900-1 1920-1 1940-1
Exports 48.2% 57.1% 44.6% 43.1% 41.6% 29.8% 22.1% 34.7%
Imports 65.0% 75.7% 72.1% 84.8% 82.9% 65.6% 60.9% 22.9%
Source: Chaudhuri (1983).
As Table 7 suggests, the rapid industrialization in the UK in the nineteenth century was associated
with a decline in the per capita level of industrialization in India. Furthermore, Bairoch (1974) found that
industries that employed new technologies made up between 60 and 70 percent of the UK manufacturing
40Clark and Feenstra (2001) establish that most of the Great Divergence occurred in the last two centuries and it is originated
by di⁄erences in labor e¢ ciency across countries. Moreover, they argue that international trade patterns re￿ected these
di⁄erences in labor e¢ ciency.
29industry in 1860 but less than 1 percent of manufacturing industries in the developing countries.
Table 7. Per Capita Industrialization Levels
1800 1860 1913 1953 1980
UK 16 64 115 210 325
Europe 8 17 45 90 267
India* 6 3 2 5 16
Source: Bairoch (1982)
The index is normalized to 100 for the UK in 1900
India is measured using its boundaries in 1913
6.2 Industrialization and Human Capital Accumulation
The process of industrialization in the UK was characterized by a gradual increase in the relative impor-
tance of human capital accumulation. In the ￿rst phase of the Industrial Revolution (1760-1830), capital
accumulation as a fraction of GNP increased signi￿cantly whereas literacy rates remained largely unchanged.
Skills and literacy requirements had been minimal and the state devoted virtually no resources to raise the
level of literacy of the masses, and economic growth was not impeded by educational retardation. Workers
developed skills primarily through on-the-job training, and child labor was highly valuable. Consequently,
literacy rates had not increased during the period 1750-1830. The requirements for technical skills in that
period, were slight and adequately met by traditional means (Galor, 2005).
In the second phase of the industrial revolution, industrialization caused an increase in the demand
for human capital by the industrial sector.41 Capital accumulation subsided, the education of the labor
force markedly increased and skills became necessary for production. The investment ratio increased from
6 percent in 1760 to 11.7 percent in the year 1831, but it remained around 11% on average in the period
1856-1913 (Crafts, 1985; Matthews et al., 1982).42 In contrast, the second half of the nineteenth century was
marked by a great expansion of education in the UK. The average years of schooling of the male labor force
of England which did not change signi￿cantly until 1830s, tripled by the beginning of the twentieth century
(Matthews et al., 1982) and school enrollment at the age of 10 increased from 40% in 1870 to 100% in 1900.
This increase in human capital investment was in part a response to an increase in demand for skilled labor
by industrialists. The British government responded to this demand by setting up in 1868 the Parliamentary
Select Committee on Scienti￿c Education which lead to the 1870 Education Act and the 1902 Balfour Act
- the education reform in England that marked the consolidation of a national education system and the
creation of a publicly supported secondary school system. A similar pattern occurred in other European
countries as well as in the USA and Canada (Galor, 2005).
41Hence the lack of non-controversial evidence about the increase in the return to skilled labor in the second phase of the
industrial revolution should not raise doubts about the validity of the proposed mechanism. The increased demand for human
capital has not resulted necessarily in an increase in the return to human capital due to a signi￿cant increase in the supply of
skilled workers that was generated by institutional changes (e.g., the provision of public education) that lowered the cost of
investment in human capital and by the increase in the incentive for investment in education.
42The emergence of human capital as a prime engine of economic growth in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution,
channeled resources towards investment in human capital as well as investment in physical capital. Consequently, although
aggregate investment in human and physical capital had increased, measured saving rates (where national accounts consider
investment in education as expenditure) remained constant.
30Education was not expanded to a similar degree in India in the 19th Century. As noted by Basu
(1974), during the nineteenth century the state of education in India was characterized by a relatively large
university sector, aimed at producing skilled bureaucrats rather than industrialists, alongside widespread
illiteracy of the masses. The literacy rate was very low, (e.g., 10% in Bengal in 1917-8) but nevertheless,
attempts to expand primary education in the twentieth century were hampered by poor attendance and high
drop out rates, which may suggest that the e⁄ective rate of return to education was relatively low. The
lack of broad based education in India can also be seen using the data of Barro and Lee (2000). Despite an
expansion of education throughout the twentieth century Barro and Lee report that in 1960 72.2 percent of
Indians aged 15 and above had ￿no schooling￿compared with 2 percent in the UK.
6.3 Industrialization, Population Growth and the Demographic Transition
For the major part of human existence economies appear to have been in a state of Malthusian stagnation.
Diminishing returns to labor along with a positive e⁄ect of the standard of living on the growth rate of
population provided a self equilibrating role for the size of the population in a stationary economic environ-
ment. Changes in the technological environment or in the availability of land led to larger but not richer
population. The growth rate of output per capita had been negligible over time and the standard of living
had not di⁄ered greatly across countries.
The emergence from Malthusian stagnation in Europe as a whole was initially very slow, (Maddison,
2001). During this slow transition, the Malthusian mechanism linking higher income to higher population
growth continued to function, but the reduction in resources per capita caused by higher population was
counteracted by technological progress, which allowed per capita income to keep rising. The average growth
of output per capita over the period 1820-1870 rose to an annual rate of 1.0 percent along with an impressive
increase in education. During this time interval, fertility rates increased in most of Western Europe until the
second half of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the acceleration in technological progress increased the
return to human capital and ultimately triggered a demographic transition in which fertility rates declined
rapidly, paving the way to an era of sustained economic growth . The level of resources invested in each
child increased and population growth fell, bringing about a sustained average annual increase in income per
capita of about two percent over the period 1929-1990 (Galor, 2005).
The evolution of population in the UK and India was characterized by these three distinct phases
as well. In the Malthusian phase population increased but income per capita remained roughly constant,
in the early take-o⁄ the growth of income per capita and population increased, and in the modern stage a
demographic transition took place and the rate of population growth falls while income per capita rises. In
the UK, population growth increased rapidly during the industrial revolution before declining sharply in the
twentieth century. In contrast India has not until recently experienced a rapid increase in industrialization
and has seen population growth increase with income in a Malthusian manner. This delay in the demographic
transition in India lead, according to the proposed theory, to the divergence between UK and India.
317 Concluding Remarks
This research suggests that the transformation in the distribution of income and population across the globe
that accompanied the take-o⁄from an epoch of stagnation to sustained economic growth is partly associated
with the contrasting e⁄ects of international trade on the timing of the demographic transition in industrial
and non-industrial countries. In industrial economies international trade has enhanced the specialization
in the production of skilled intensive goods and stimulated technological progress. The rise in the demand
for skilled labor has induced an investment in the quality of the population, expediting the demographic
transition, stimulating technological progress and further enhancing the comparative advantage of these
industrial economies in the production of skilled intensive goods. In non-industrial economies, in contrast,
the specialization in the production of unskilled intensive goods that has been triggered by international
trade has reduced the demand for skilled labor, providing limited incentives to invest in population quality.
The demographic transition has been therefore delayed, increasing further the abundance of unskilled labor
in these economies and enhancing their comparative disadvantage in the production of skilled intensive
goods. International trade has therefore widened the gap between the technological level as well as the
skill abundance of industrial and non-industrial economies, enhancing the initial patterns of comparative
advantage and generating sustained di⁄erences in income per capita across countries.
The asymmetric e⁄ect of international trade on the timing of the demographic transition in developed
and less-developed economies, and its persistent e⁄ect, therefore, on the initial patterns of comparative ad-
vantage, may suggest that the rapid transition of the currently developed economies into a state of sustained
economic growth is associated with the slow transition of less developed economies into a state of sustained
economic growth.
The analysis abstracts from several factors that are relevant for the assessment of the e⁄ects of inter-
national trade on population growth and the process of development in less developed economies. Cultural
and institutional di⁄erences between countries in the determination of population growth, in the provision
of public education, and in the process of technological change would be re￿ ected in the demographic char-
acteristics and in the patterns of comparative advantage. Moreover, the adverse e⁄ect of international trade
on industrialization and thus on the timing of the demographic transition could have been mitigated by the
positive e⁄ect of trade on technological di⁄usion across countries. Nevertheless, labor productivity greatly
di⁄ers across countries and even among industries in which technologies are very similar. Moreover, since
the rate of technological di⁄usion depends upon the appropriateness of factor endowments in the receiving
country, the adverse e⁄ect of trade on the factor endowment of less developed economies would slow down
the rate of technological di⁄usion.43
In contrast to the existing literature on the dynamics of comparative advantage, the focus on the inter-
action between population growth and comparative advantage and the persistent e⁄ect that this interaction
may have on the distribution of population and income in the world economy generates an important new
43The e⁄ect of trade on technological di⁄usion is discussed by Findlay (1996). The imperfections in this process are illustrated
for instance by Clark (1987) who shows that despite the fact that in 1910 textile machinery was uniform around the world,
labor productivity was ten times higher in advanced countries than in the less developed ones. This imperfection may be related
to the e⁄ect of factor endowments on the adoption of technologies (Basu and Weil, 1998); Zeira, 1998; Acemoglu and Zilibotti,
2001).
32insight regarding the distribution of the gains from trade. The theory suggests that even if trade between
developed and less developed economies equalizes output growth in the trading countries, income per capita
of developed and less developed economies will diverge, since in developed economies the growth of total
output will be generated primarily by an increase in output per capita, whereas in less developed economies
the contribution of population growth to the growth of total output will be more signi￿cant.
In accordance with the theory, cross country regression analysis supports the hypothesis that inter-
national trade generates opposing e⁄ects on fertility rates and education in developed and less developed
economies. It demonstrates that international trade has a positive e⁄ect on fertility and a negative e⁄ect
on human capital formation in non-OECD economies, whereas in OECD economies, trade triggers a decline
in fertility and an increase in human capital accumulation. Thus, international trade accentuates the initial
patterns of comparative advantage and is likely to a⁄ect di⁄erently the growth trajectory of population,
human capital, and income per capita of developed and less developed economies.
33Appendix: Summary Statistics and Data Sources
Table A1. Summary Statistics
Non-OECD Economies OECD Economies
Observations Mean Observations Mean
Average Total Fertility Rate 1985-1990 108 4:84 24 1:76
Average Total Fertility Rate 1985-1995 108 4:65 24 1:75
Average Total Fertility Rate 1985-2000 108 4:46 24 1:72
Average Crude Birth Rate 1985-1990 108 35:18 24 13:56
Average Infant Mortality Rate 1985-1990 108 70:06 24 10:89
Average years of schooling 1985 74 4:18 23 8:28
Average year of schooling 1990 76 4:57 23 8:75
Average year of schooling 1995 73 4:97 23 9:13
Average year of schooling 2000 73 5:22 23 9:40
Average years of primary schooling, 1985 74 3:06 23 5:04
Average years of primary schooling, 1990 76 3:27 23 5:14
Log GDP Per Capita 1985 108 7:49 24 9:28
Log Trade Share in GDP 1985 108 4:09 24 4:16
Log Propensity to Trade (Frankel-Romer IV) 108 2:97 24 2:90
Crude Birth Rate - The number of births per 1,000 population,.estimated for the ￿ve-year intervals, 1985-
1990. Source: UN Population Division: http://esa.un.org/unpp/.
Total Fertility Rate - The average number of children a hypothetical cohort of women would have at the end
of their reproductive period if they were subject during their whole lives to the fertility rates of a given period
and if they were not subject to mortality. It is expressed as children per woman, estimated for the ￿ve-year
intervals: 1985-1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2000. Source: UN Population Division: http://esa.un.org/unpp/.
Infant mortality rate - The probability of dying between birth and exact age 1. It is expressed as deaths
per 1,000 births, estimated for the ￿ve-year intervals 1985-1990. Source: UN Population Division:
http://esa.un.org/unpp/.
Frankel-Romer instrument - Intrinsic propensity to trade in 1985 for countries in the world. Source: Frankel
and Romer (1999).
Share of Trade in GDP in 1985. Source: Frankel and Romer (1999). Also available from Penn World Tables
Mark 5.6, series OPEN.
Log GDP per capita 1985. Source: Penn World Tables Mark 5.6, series RGDPCH.
Average years of schooling in the total population aged 15 and above. Source: Barro Lee (2000).
Average years of primary schooling in the total population aged 15 and above. Source: Barro Lee (2000).
OECD. - Economies that were members of the OECD in 1985 and are also part of the Frankel Romer
data set. They are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States of America.
Eastern European Countries - These are economies that were in Eastern Europe in1985 and are also part
of the Frankel Romer data set. They are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania.
34OPEC - . Economies that were members of OPEC in 1985 and are also part of the Frankel Romer data set.
They are: Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela.
Appendix B
Lemma A1 In the Malthusian stage, if technology is stationary, there exists a unique locally stable steady
state level of population if (i) (1￿￿￿￿)=￿u > 1; (ii) ￿ > [(1￿￿￿￿)￿(1￿￿)￿u]=[(1￿￿￿￿)+(1￿￿)￿u];
and (iii) N0 < (aa
0=e c)1=(1￿￿):


















pt < e c
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pt ￿ e c;
Condition (i) of the Lemma ensures that when agents are unconstrained and are rearing only unskilled
children, the population is rising. Noting the properties of the old agricultural production technology (1),
the economy will eventually reach a state where its agents are constrained by the subsistence constraint.
The steady state value of N; is
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]g 2 (￿1;1);
provided, as guaranteed by condition (iii), that the initial level of population is su¢ ciently small so as to
assure that the initial average product of labor is not below the subsistence level. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4.
(a) Follows from (A1), (A2) and Lemma 3, noting that g(0) > 0.
(b) Lemma A1 shows that under the old technology the unskilled wage, aa
t(L
a;0
0 )￿￿1; tends to the constant
level of e c(1￿￿￿￿)=[(1￿￿￿￿)￿(1￿￿)￿u] ￿ ~ wu: However since Aa
t is rising over time, there exits a time




0 )￿￿1: For (ta)￿ < t < (tm)￿ it follows from (13) that the population will
be higher than it would have been in the Malthusian regime. Therefore the shadow Malthusian unskilled
wage given by aa
t((L
a;0
t )￿)￿￿1 will be below the level ~ wu: (where (L
a;0
t )￿ is the level of employment in the old
agricultural sector necessary for the old agricultural sector alone to satisfy the total demand for agricultural




t )￿)￿￿1 still holds. For





holds since the demand for agricultural goods will be at least as high as it would have been without any
new technologies, and thus the shadow Malthusian unskilled wage will be below the level ~ wu.44 Finally, for
t > (tm)￿￿, the demand for agricultural goods will be growing at the rate of growth of Aa
t; which is a greater
rate than would be occurring under the Malthusian system. Thus again the shadow Malthusian unskilled




t )￿)￿￿1 still holds. ￿
Proof of Lemma 5.
44For some parameter speci￿cations the fall in fertility caused by the introduction of the new industrial technology may
reduce fertility so much and for so long that the population falls below the level it would have attained if the economy had




t )￿)￿￿1 rises above Aa: We regard this as a highly unlikely and very counter factual. Based on McEvedy and Jones￿ s
(1978), the population of the British Isles grew from 5 million in 1500 to 10 million in 1750. If growth continued at this rate
then the current population of the British Isles would have been 20 million, much below its current actual level of approximately
60 million. Hence, the underlying assumption implies that the population at the beginning of the modern industrial stage is
greater than it would have without the existence of the new production technologies.
35(i) If Y
m;N
t+1 = 0; it follows from (14) that ws
t+1=wu
t+1 = 0 < ￿s=￿u and n
i;s
t = 0 for all i: Hence, ht+1 = 0:
(ii) If Y
a;N
t+1 > 0 and Y
m;N
t+1 > 0 then ws
t+1=wu
t+1 = ￿s=￿u and n
i;s
t > 0; for some i; and ht+1 > 0: Let NA
t
and NM
t be the number of unskilled individuals employed in the agricultural and the manufacturing sector
in period t, respectively, and let Ht be the number of skilled individuals employed in the manufacturing
sector in period t: Hence, NA
t + NM
t + Ht = Nt; where Nt is the number of individuals in the working
generation. Let lu
t and ls
t be the labor supply of unskilled and skilled individuals, respectively. It follows that









t , respectively, and the amount of skilled labor employed in the manufacturing sector is
Hm
t = ls
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t =pt < e c
￿ + ￿ if ￿wu
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t ￿ ls(￿t) if ￿ws
t=pt < e c
￿ + ￿ if ￿ws
t=pt ￿ e c
Case (a): (￿wu
t =pt) < (￿ws
t=pt) < e c. As follows from (2) and (11), an equilibrium in the agricultural good





t =Nt = lu
t NA
t =Nt = e c=Aa
t ￿ La(￿t): Similarly, using the
equilibrium conditions in the manufacturing sector, L
m;N
t =Nt = lu
t NM
t =Nt ￿ Lm(￿t): Finally, as following
from Lemma 1, Hm
t =Nt = ls
tHt=Nt = (hm)￿lu
t NM
t =Nt ￿ Hm(￿t); since lu
t NM
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t NM
t =Nt) + (ls
tHt=Nt)
￿ h(￿t):
where h0(￿t+1) > 0 since an increase in the level of technology, raises the wage level and leads to an increase
in the budget share of manufactured good and hence a rise in the production of the manufactured good and
thus an increase in the skill intensity of the labor force.
Case (b) e c < (￿wu
t =pt) < (￿ws



































Thus, noting that Ht = (hm)￿NM
t and NA
t = [(￿=￿)f(hm)￿NM
t ]=wu((hm)￿); it follows that
ht = (hm)￿=[((￿=￿)f(hm)￿=(wu((hm)￿)) + (hm)￿ + 1] = e h:
Case (c): (￿wu
t =pt) < e c < (￿ws
t=pt). Following the lines of arguments in case (a) and (b) the result follows.
￿
Appendix C
This appendix demonstrates that the qualitative results would not alter if the production technology
in the agricultural section remains land-intensive.
If the economy is characterized by 3 production technologies: an old agricultural technology, described
in (1) and an old and new industrial technologies described in (3-4), one would need to replace Assumption
A1-A3 with a stronger set of assumptions so as to assure that the technologically advanced economy would
have a comparative advantage in the production of industrial goods.
In the three-technology model, the relative price of the agricultural good in terms of the manufactured























t )￿￿1 if Y
m;N
t > 0:
36The productivity parameters are restricted such that in addition to (A1) and (A2)




= K￿ for K > 1: ((A3￿ ))
This implies that the technologically advanced economy will have a comparative advantage in the industrial
sector if K is su¢ ciently large.
The advancement in the productivity of the agricultural sector, Aa
t;with ￿t is such that, at some point
e t where ht = e h the rate of technological progress rises su¢ ciently high so that the subsistence constraint





> [(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)=￿u](1￿￿) ((A4￿ ))
where ht ￿ e h. In order to assure that the pattern of trade is consistent with historical patterns will assume
that K is su¢ ciently large for pA
t > pB
t ; when the two economies begin to trade:
Lemma A2 Economy A has a comparative advantage in the industrial good if K is su¢ ciently large.
























Thus the inequality will hold for a su¢ ciently large value of K: ￿
The rest of the results are established straightforwardly subject to (A1), (A2), (A3￿ ) and (A4￿ ).
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